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Abstract: Studying consciousness requires contrasting conscious and unconscious perception.
While many studies have reported unconscious perceptual effects, recent work has questioned
whether such effects are genuinely unconscious, or whether they are due to weak conscious
perception. Some philosophers and psychologists have reacted by denying that there is such a
thing as unconscious perception, or by holding that unconscious perception has been previously
overestimated. This article has two parts. In the first part, I argue that the most significant attack
on unconscious perception commits the criterion content fallacy: the fallacy of interpreting
evidence that observers were conscious of something as evidence that they were conscious of the
task-relevant features of the stimuli. In the second part, I contend that the criterion content fallacy
is prevalent in consciousness research. For this reason, I hold that if unconscious perception
exists, scientists studying consciousness could routinely underestimate it. I conclude with
methodological recommendations for moving the debate forward.
Unconscious perception is like Sisyphus’ rock. Each time researchers believe they have proved it,
the rock rolls down, and they have to start over again (Irvine, 2012a; Michel, 2020). Tired of
having to imagine Sisyphus happy, researchers have developed new tasks with the potential to
demonstrate the existence of unconscious perception once and for all (Peters & Lau, 2015). And
as these experiments have failed to find a single trace of unconscious perception, the top of the
hill looks unattainable. Consciousness researchers are not like Sisyphus, the skeptics argue. They
are like Tantalus: desperately reaching for something they cannot have. This article is a response
to the skeptics. Unconscious perception is within our grasp.
Determining whether unconscious perception exists is crucial for current discussions on
consciousness and perception. Theories of consciousness typically aim to identify the
mechanisms distinguishing conscious from unconscious perception (e.g., Brown et al. 2019;
Mashour et al. 2020; Lamme, 2015). If unconscious perception does not exist, such theories are
probably wrong. The issue is also relevant for philosophical theories of perception: unconscious
perception is commonly thought to support ‘representationalist’ views of perception over ‘naïve
realist’ views (Berger & Nanay, 2016).
The current orthodoxy is that unconscious perception exists. The evidence for this
comes from a wide variety of experimental paradigms in which healthy participants – and
neurological patients – can identify properties of stimuli that they fail to report perceiving
(Breitmeyer, 2015; Kim & Blake, 2005; LeDoux et al. 2020; Weiskrantz, 2009).
Philosophers and psychologists have challenged this orthodox view (e.g., Peters & Lau,
2015; Phillips, 2016). Unconscious perception deniers argue that purported cases of unconscious
perception could be interpreted instead as cases of weakly conscious, non-reported perception.
In this view, alleged evidence for unconscious perception stems from the fact that subjects often
fail to report seeing weakly conscious stimuli: their subjective reports are biased. I will say more
about the concept of ‘report bias’ in what follows. For now, the key point is that when subjects
are not sure whether they saw a stimulus or not, as often happens for very weak stimuli, they
tend to give a response indicating not seeing anything. If subjects were not biased in this way, the
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skeptics argue, evidence for unconscious perception would vanish (Balsdon & Clifford, 2018;
Cheesman & Merikle, 1986; Eriksen, 1960; Goldiamond, 1958; Irvine, 2012b, 2019; Merikle,
1982, 1984; Phillips, 2016, 2018, 2021; Reingold & Merikle, 1988, 1990).
To support their claim, the skeptics rely on experimental paradigms controlling for the
effects of report biases (more on this in Section 1) (Barthelme and Mamassian, 2009; de Gardelle
and Mamassian, 2014; Peters & Lau, 2015). The bad news for unconscious perception
enthusiasts is that once biases are controlled for, as done in a series of studies by Peters and
colleagues, subjects do not exhibit behaviors consistent with unconscious perception (Knotts et
al. 2018; Peters et al. 2017; Peters & Lau, 2015). Following Berger & Mylopoulos (2019, p.1), this
series of studies can be considered as “the most powerful evidence” in support of the conclusion
that purported cases of  unconscious perception are actually cases of  weak conscious perception.
If the skeptics are correct, a wide variety of methods usually thought to elicit
unconscious perception actually do not (Breitmeyer, 2015; Kim & Blake, 2007). And if this is
true, Sisyphus’ rock is indeed pushed way downhill. Many experiments carried out by
consciousness researchers in the last four decades would pretty much count for nothing.
Experimenters thought that they were contrasting conscious and unconscious perception when
they were merely contrasting reported and unreported conscious perception. At the very least,
unconscious perception would have been significantly overestimated.
Before we move on, it is important to note that this debate is about the existence of
unconscious perception, not mere unconscious sensory processing. For instance, neurons in the
primary visual cortex could carry information about the shadows cast by retinal blood vessels
(Adams & Horton, 2002). But if that’s the case, we are seldom, if ever, conscious of those
shadows. Most skeptics would accept unconscious sensory processing, or unconscious sensory
registration of this kind (Burge, 2010; Phillips, 2016, 2021). However, they would argue that the
mere fact that some neurons respond to this feature is not sufficient to indicate a genuinely
perceptual unconscious state. Perception is a personal-level phenomenon: a perceptual state is a
state that can be attributed to a subject, not merely to her visual system. Evidence for
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unconscious perception would come, for instance, from evidence that an unconscious perceptual
state is available for personal-level decisions, such as overt categorization responses.
In this article, I argue that the evidence interpreted as indicating that unconscious
perception does not exist is in fact consistent with the hypothesis that there is unconscious
perception . My critique of this evidence also applies more generally to a variety of experimental1
paradigms in consciousness science. I suggest that many procedures used to determine whether
subjects are conscious or unconscious of stimuli are too conservative when it comes to
attributing unconscious perception. As a result, I claim that if unconscious perception exists, it
could be underestimated in consciousness research.
1. Motivating Skepticism
1.1. The criterion problem
Signal Detection Theory is the main framework for interpreting subjects' responses in
experimental settings (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). In this framework, a
response in a perceptual task is the conjoint product of sensory evidence for the presence of a2
target stimulus, and a criterion for responding that the target stimulus is present.
2 While the term ‘sensory evidence’ is standardly used in Signal Detection Theory (SDT) when it is
applied to perceptual decisions, it describes the largely sub-personal process, carried out by the perceptual
system, of receiving a signal of a given strength indicating the presence of a given stimulus feature. SDT is
not committed to this being ‘evidence’ in the sense in which persons have evidence, or in the sense in
which perceptual experience supplies evidence.
1 See Berger & Myrtopoulos (2019) for a similar attempt, and Phillips (2020) for a response. Another
strategy to respond to the skeptics is to provide cases that meet the criteria for perception and unconsciousness
(e.g., Block, 2016; Quilty-Dunn, 2019; Peters et al., 2017b). While I agree with all these past efforts, my
critique extends more generally to the methods used for assessing unconscious perception in the scientific
study of  consciousness.
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For this reason, a subject’s observed tendency to answer “not seen” more often than
would be expected if she consciously saw the stimulus can have multiple interpretations,
depending on the putative source of  this tendency.
A straightforward explanation is that the subject tends to press the “not seen” button
more often than would be expected if she saw the stimuli because she feels like she doesn’t see
the stimuli. But that’s not the only explanation.
One alternative is that the subject has a general preference for pressing a particular
response button. For instance, right-handers tend to favor answering with the right index finger.
Over the course of a long and difficult experiment, this could bias the subject’s responses. This
factor should be controlled for.
A more serious worry is that the subject could misinterpret task instructions. The instruction
to press a button when the stimulus is ‘not seen’ might have several interpretations, varying from
participant to participant. For example, some participants might answer “not seen” when they
have a vague feeling of having seen something, but have no idea what they saw; while other
participants might answer “not seen” only when they have the feeling that nothing was presented
on the screen at all. A participant with the former interpretation will tend to press the ‘not seen’
button more often than a participant with the latter interpretation.
Finally, the observer could be unable to comply with task instructions. For example,
participants presented with a range of stimulus strengths might be unable to optimize criterion
setting for each stimulus strength. Instead, they could set a single criterion across multiple
stimulus strengths (Gorea & Sagi, 2000, 2002; Rahnev et al. 2011; Rahnev, 2020; but see Denison
et al. 2018). Doing so would usually result in an overly conservative criterion for weak stimuli,
since the participant relies on a criterion optimized for mid-range stimulus strength when judging
the visibility of  weak stimuli.
As most experiments in consciousness research do not control for these last two factors,
interpreting the observer’s tendency to answer “not seen” as indicating that she does not
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consciously perceive the stimuli is not directly justified. Instead, this behavior could be explained
by factors that do not have much to do with consciousness, like misinterpretation of task
instructions or inability to comply with task instructions.
The criterion problem, as it applies in consciousness research, is the problem of determining
how the observer’s tendency to answer “not seen” should be interpreted. In most experiments,
behavior alone underdetermines what interpretation should be favored (Goldiamond, 1958;
Eriksen, 1960; Peters et al., 2016; Reingold & Merikle, 1988, 1990). To solve that problem, one
should rule out a variety of factors in order to leave the absence of consciousness as the only
plausible explanation of  the observer’s behavior.
1.2. The 2IFC paradigm
One solution to the criterion problem is to use ‘bias-free’, or at least ‘bias-discouraging’ tasks,
such as 2-interval forced choice paradigms (2IFC). For our purpose, the main study using this
paradigm was conducted by Peters & Lau (2015) . In this study, subjects had to discriminate, in3
two successive intervals, whether a grating was right- or left-tilted. Then, they indicated which of
the two discrimination decisions they felt more confident in by betting either on their
discrimination decision in the first, or second interval (Figure 1). In a control condition, this
betting task was replaced by a task in which subjects reported in which interval the stimulus was
more visible. The crucial trick in Peters and Lau’s experiment is that, unbeknownst to the
subjects, some intervals actually did not contain a target.
3 In this article, I focus on unconscious perception in healthy subjects. Perhaps the most successful
demonstration of unconscious perception to date was achieved by Azzopardi & Cowey (1997) with
blindsight patient G.Y., comparing 2IFC detection performance to Yes-No detection performance (see
also Yoshida & Isa, 2015; and Michel & Lau (2021) for a discussion of this result). I come back to
Azzopardi & Cowey’s (1997) experiment in Section 4.
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Figure 1. Source: Peters and Lau (2015). 2IFC task. (A) Targets are either right- or left-tilted gratings.
(B) Each trial consists of two intervals of discrimination. Some intervals contain a target (TP). In other
intervals, the target is replaced by a blank frame (TA). (C) Experimental tasks. In Experiment 1 subjects
bet on which discrimination decision they feel more confident in and then indicate the orientation of the
gratings in both intervals. In Experiment 2, subjects bet on the interval after the discriminations, and
feedback is given.
Now, imagine what happens if you do not see the target consciously. “Seeing” the target feels just
like seeing nothing at all. If subjects are not aware of the targets, they should thus judge the
target-present intervals to be just as visible as the target-absent intervals. This should translate
behaviorally into chance-level performance for responding that the stimulus is more visible in
the target-present interval compared to the target-absent interval, or in the betting version of the
task, in random bets on either the target-present or target-absent intervals.
So, consciousness of the targets can be assessed by analyzing the participants’ behavior on
the betting task, called the Type-2 task. Meanwhile, perception of the targets is evaluated by
analyzing their behavior on the discrimination task, called the Type-1 task (Galvin et al. 2003).
Above-chance performance on the Type-1 task indicates that subjects perceive the targets.
From here, there are two possible outcomes. If subjects are at chance level on the Type-2
task, but above chance on the Type-1 task, they perceive the targets unconsciously. If subjects are
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above chance on the Type-2 task as soon as they are above chance on the Type-1 task, the
experiment does not demonstrate unconscious perception.
2IFC paradigms are relatively free from biases (Green and Swets, 1966; Macmillan and
Creelman, 2005) and can be used to rule out the different factors mentioned above. First, the
target is randomly presented either in the first or second interval: a general tendency to press the
button corresponding for instance to ‘First Interval’ will not move the result in any particular
direction. Second, since the observer’s judgment is not a matter of ‘how much’ visibility, but a
relative judgment, the 2IFC paradigms also provide relatively unambiguous task instructions.
Finally, as long as the stimuli presented in the two intervals only vary in one dimension (in this
case, the dimension determining target visibility), observers do not have to maintain multiple
criteria, or choose how to weight several stimulus dimensions.
Controlling for biases in this way, Peters & Lau (2015) report that subjects do not exhibit
behaviors consistent with unconscious perception. When observers can discriminate between
stimuli, they also tend to bet on the target-present interval more often than the target-absent
interval. The same result is obtained in the control condition in which subjects provide visibility
judgments: observers tend to judge that the target is more visible in the target-present compared
to the target-absent interval. As such, Peters & Lau’s experiment indicates that unconscious
perception is not as easy to elicit in healthy subjects as previously thought once criterion biases
are controlled for (see also Balsdon & Clifford, 2018).
A weak interpretation of this result, as well as similar results (Peters et al. 2017; Knotts et
al. 2018) , is that it indicates that unconscious perception has been overestimated in most studies in4
4 Several studies have replicated Peters & Lau’s result with different suppression techniques, such as visual
suppression with transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) (Peters et al. 2017), continuous flash
suppression, interocular suppression and backward masking (Knotts et al., 2018). However, we should
avoid strong interpretations of these results. In the study by Peters et al. (2017) using TMS visual
suppression, only about 5% of all trials were actually relevant for assessing unconscious perception – or
what the authors call “absolute blindsight”. As Koenig & Ro (2019) write: “there was an insufficient
number of trials to adequately measure absolute TMS-induced blindsight” (p.219). The study by Knotts et
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consciousness research. A stronger interpretation is that most methods thought to elicit
unconscious perception actually do not. After controlling for criterion biases, evidence for
unconscious perception vanishes (Balsdon & Clifford, 2018; Phillips, 2016, 2018). In the next
section, I hold that this strong interpretation is unwarranted. In Section 3, I will argue that, if it
exists, unconscious perception could be underestimated in consciousness research.
2. Conscious… of  what?
When we say that subjects are conscious or unconscious, we should always ask ourselves:
conscious or unconscious... of what? It is one thing to be conscious that something was presented. It
is another to be conscious of the target stimulus, and yet another to be conscious of the
task-relevant feature of the stimulus. I can see the same briefly flashed stimulus as a dog, as an
animal, as a bunch of unclear geometrical lines, or as a brief flash of light (Bowers & Jones, 2008;
Mack et al. 2008; Mack & Palmeri, 2010; Stazicker, 2011; Straube & Fahle, 2011; Thomas, 1985).
al. (2018) compared a variety of visual suppression techniques to backward and forward masking, and
observed that all visual suppression methods equally impacted Type-1 and Type-2 performances. If one
accepts Peters & Lau’s (2015) original conclusion, this study thus indicates that a wide variety of methods
are equally bad at inducing unconscious perception as forward and backward masking. But if one doesn’t
accept that conclusion, the study indicates that a wide variety of methods are equally good at inducing
unconscious perception as forward and backward masking. Below, I argue that a strong interpretation of
Peters & Lau’s result is unwarranted. If so, interpreting Knotts et al.’s result as indicating that a variety of
visual suppression techniques actually do not induce unconscious perception is unwarranted as well.
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Stimuli have many features like shape, size, color, contrast, or duration . But only some5
of those features are relevant to perform the Type-1 task successfully. In Peters & Lau’s study,
the orientation of the gratings is the task-relevant feature. That is, participants cannot perform this
task above-chance without forming a representation of that specific feature.
Asking whether unconscious perception is possible amounts to asking whether this
representation can determine the discrimination decision without the observer being conscious
of its content. For Type-2 judgments to be informative with respect to that question, they must
indicate that subjects were conscious of the task-relevant features of the stimuli –– that is, conscious
of  the very features that they used to perform the Type-1 task successfully.
As Newell & Shanks (2014) argued, assessment of awareness should, as much as possible,
target only the information that is relevant for performing the behavioral task (See also Shanks &
St John, 1994). If the measures used to infer perception and awareness are not about the same
contents, then one is bound to either overestimate or underestimate unconscious processing
(Newell & Shanks p.4).
In Peters & Lau’s experiment, betting judgments are not determined only –– and perhaps
not even primarily –– by the conscious perception of task-relevant features. Seeing just a vague
contour, or a contrast difference between the target and the mask, or having the feeling that
something grey-ish was present between the masks, is sufficient to bet on the target present
5 Task-irrelevant features are represented along with task-relevant features (Marshall & Bays, 2013; Xu,
2010). Importantly, visual masking has different effects on various stimulus features (Breitmeyer, 1984;
Kahneman, 1968; Koivisto & Neuvonen, 2020; Ogmen et al., 2003), as well as on detection and
discrimination performances (Jimenez et al. 2019). For instance, optimal suppressions of a target’s
contour and target’s brightness with metacontrast and paracontrast masking occur at different
asynchronies between the mask and the target (Breitmeyer et al., 2006; Stober et al., 1978). Similar results
have been obtained with other suppression techniques, such as binocular rivalry paradigms (Gelbart-Sagiv
et al. 2016; Hong & Blake, 2009; Zadbood et al. 2011), or visual crowding (Doerig et al. 2019; Manassi &
Whitney, 2018). Hence, one cannot simply assume that all stimulus features, both task-relevant and
task-irrelevant, are equally impacted by awareness suppression techniques.
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interval above chance. Whereas the Type-1 task requires representing task-relevant features,
subjects can correctly bet on the target-present interval without consciously representing any of
those features. Having the feeling of seeing something in one interval compared to the other,
however indeterminate that impression, is sufficient to bet on the target-present interval above
chance.
For this reason, based on a subject’s above-chance betting performance, one can
conclude that the subject consciously perceived that something was present in one of the two
intervals, or that something was different between the two intervals. But nothing warrants the
stronger conclusion that the subject bet on the target present interval above chance because she
was conscious of  the very features that led her to perform the Type-1 task above chance.
This leaves an alternative interpretation open. Although observers subjectively
distinguish the target-present from the target-absent interval, since they see that something is
present in one of the two intervals, they successfully perform the Type-1 task based on an
unconscious representation of  the task-relevant feature of  the stimulus .6
To put it bluntly, subjects feel like they see a grey-ish blob for a very brief moment in one
interval, and not the other. Because seeing something is better than seeing nothing at all, they bet on
the interval in which they saw something. But while they feel like they see a grey-ish blob, subjects
unconsciously perceive the orientation of the grating. This unconscious perception of the
task-relevant feature drives subjects’ Type-1 performance, while the conscious perception of
something concomitantly increases their betting performance The unconscious perception of the
6 By accepting this interpretation of the evidence, one is committed to a weak version of the ‘partial
awareness hypothesis’ (Kouider et al. 2010), according to which different levels of representations can be
consciously accessed independently. This version of the partial awareness hypothesis only requires one to
accept that one can be conscious of the surface features of a stimulus (e.g. the color of the stimulus)
without being conscious of its contour features (e.g. its orientation) (see Breitmeyer (2014) for a
book-length defense of this view, partly based on a review of the evidence mentioned in Footnote 4). For
the purpose of this article, I remain neutral on what other kinds of dissociations could be observed, for
example on the question of whether high-level features such as object category can be consciously
accessed independently of low-level features, or whether contour features (e.g. shape) could be
consciously experienced without any experience of  surface features (e.g. color).
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orientation of the stimulus is hidden within the conscious perception of a grey blob – an instance
of unconscious perception within conscious perception (See Block’s contribution to Peters et al.
2017b).
Peters & Lau (2015) themselves suggested a similar interpretation for their result (see
Section ‘2IFC detection’). However, they discarded it on the basis that such an interpretation
cannot account for the ‘flat’ Type-2 false alarm rate observed in the data. The Type-2 false alarm
is defined by Peters & Lau as incorrect orientation discrimination and bet on target-present
interval. Suppose subjects were really performing the betting task simply by consciously
detecting the presence of something. In that case, we should expect the Type-2 false alarm rate to
increase as signal strength increases, since subjects are more likely to bet on the target-present
interval with increasing signal strength. This, they argue, is incompatible with the observed flat
Type-2 false alarm rate. However, as Phillips (2021) noted, subjects are also more likely to
perform the discrimination task correctly as signal strength increases, which should in turn
decrease the participants’ Type-2 false alarm rate (as defined above). A flat Type-2 false alarm rate
could thus result from these two countervailing influences.
To be clear, Peters & Lau do provide an answer to the question of knowing whether, in
their visual masking task, totally unconscious percepts can represent orientation. The answer is
no. But this is the right answer to the wrong question. The right question is whether there can be
an unconscious representation of orientation, even if that representation is within a conscious
percept. That is, one wants to assess whether subjects are conscious of the features that drive
their Type-1 discrimination performance, not whether they are conscious of anything at all. And
Peters & Lau do not answer that question. So, their result does not demonstrate that subjects
need to be conscious of the orientation if they are to perform above-chance on the discrimination
task. It merely shows that they need to be conscious of something. But being conscious of
something is compatible with unconsciously representing the task-relevant features of the
stimuli. And if that’s the case, this experiment is far from demonstrating that unconscious
perception does not exist.
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Before explaining how the same reasoning applies to various procedures for detecting
consciousness, let me be clear on what I do, and what I do not claim. I do not claim that
scientists should not use 2IFC paradigms. Under some conditions, a positive result with a 2IFC
paradigm would suggest unconscious perception (See section 4). However, a null result with a
2IFC paradigm – like all null results – should be interpreted carefully. A failure to meet the
high-standard set by the 2IFC approach does not mean that unconscious perception does not
exist, or that all previous unconscious effects demonstrated in the literature resulted from
uncontrolled response criteria.
3. The criterion content fallacy
Research on consciousness has often ignored what Kahneman (1968) called the criterion content:
the set of features on which observers base their perceptual (or metacognitive) decisions.
Differences in the criterion contents used to perform the Type-1 and Type-2 tasks often go
uncontrolled: Type-1 and Type-2 judgments are not based on the same features. Type-2
judgments usually have a permissive criterion content: they can be based on the perception of any
visual features (or even non-visual features, as I explain in Section 3.2). Type-1 judgments in
discrimination tasks typically have a more restrictive criterion content: these judgments are based
on the perception of  task-relevant (visual) features.
The discrepancy between permissive and restrictive criterion contents leads researchers
to commit the criterion content fallacy: the fallacy of concluding that subjects are conscious of the
task-relevant features of the stimuli based on the mere evidence that they are conscious of something.
Committing this fallacy, in turn, leads researchers to systematically overestimate the observers’
consciousness of the visual features used to perform the Type-1 discrimination task. Trials in
which the subjects’ reports do not warrant the conclusion that they are conscious of the
task-relevant features of the stimuli are nevertheless categorized as conscious trials. To illustrate
this fallacy, let me focus on procedures relying on the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS).
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3.1. A case study: the Perceptual Awareness Scale
The PAS allows subjects to provide judgments with the following response categories: “No
experience”, “Brief glimpse”, “Almost clear image”, “Absolutely clear image” (Ramsøy &
Overgaard, 2004; Sandberg et al. 2010). It has been used in a wide variety of studies. Here’s a
small, non-exhaustive sample: the PAS is involved in determining whether working memory
contents can be represented unconsciously (Trübutschek et al. 2019), whether blindsight subjects
have weak conscious experiences (Overgaard et al. 2008; Mazzi et al. 2016), whether conscious
perception is graded or all-or-none (Windey et al. 2014), whether subjects have weak conscious
experiences in exclusion tasks (Sandberg et al. 2014), as well as to identify neural correlates of
consciousness (e.g., Andersen et al. 2016; Tagliabue et al. 2016).
Despite its widespread use, remarkably little work has been done to investigate the
validity of the interpretation of PAS ratings as indications of conscious perception (Michel, 2019)
. If using the PAS leads researchers to commit the criterion content fallacy, unconscious7
perception of task-relevant features could have been underestimated in all those studies – among
many others. I believe that’s the case. Let me explain why.
Experimenters typically describe the second level on the PAS – usually called “Brief
glimpse” – as “A feeling that something has been shown. Not characterized by any content and
this cannot be specified any further” (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004, p.12). That is, subjects use the
7 It is not clear whether tasks relying on the PAS should count as Type-2 tasks or not. Galvin et al. (2003)
defined a Type-1 task as a task in which “an observer decides which of two or more events defined
independently of the observer has occurred” (p.843), while they restrict Type-2 tasks to “The task of
discriminating between one’s own correct and incorrect Type 1 decisions” (p.843). The PAS was
introduced as a scale for judging the ‘clarity’ of one’s own conscious experience of a stimulus (Ramsøy &
Overgaard, 2004). This dimension is not ‘defined independently of the observer’. On the other hand, it is
possible that the subjects simply rate the perceived clarity of the stimulus (Michel, 2019), essentially
committing what Titchener called “the stimulus error” (Tichener, 1905; Boring, 1921). In this latter case,
the observers’ judgments are about objectively definable properties, such as, for instance, stimulus
duration and contrast.
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“Brief glimpse” response category when they see something, but do not consciously perceive the
task-relevant features of  the stimuli.
With a few exceptions (e.g. Melloni et al. 2011), most researchers interpret trials in which
subjects report seeing just a “brief glimpse” as conscious trials –– trials in which the sensory
information used to perform the Type-1 task was conscious (e.g. Bergström & Eriksson, 2014;
King et al. 2016; Soto et al. 2011; Trübutschek et al. 2019). Yet, consciously seeing something, or
just a ‘brief glimpse’, is compatible with unconsciously representing task-relevant features. And it is
even compatible with the complete absence of  perception of  the task-relevant features.
Indeed, in a study by Mazzi et al. (2016), subjects often used the “brief glimpse” report
category even when they were at chance on the Type-1 discrimination task, indicating no
perception of the task-relevant features. Similarly, in a study by Jimenez et al. (2019) participants
performed a detection task followed by a discrimination task, and then rated perceptual
awareness with the PAS. Subjects often reported “weak perception” even if they couldn’t
perform the discrimination task above chance, but could only detect the presence of a stimulus.
These studies indicate that the “brief glimpse” report category is not tied to the conscious
representation of task-relevant features. If so, it should not be interpreted as indicating conscious
perception of  those features.
Doing otherwise amounts to committing the criterion content fallacy. Given the way in
which the report category is described to the subjects, the use of the “brief glimpse” report
category does not warrant the conclusion that the subject was conscious of the task-relevant feature
of the stimulus (Dienes & Seth, 2010; Jimenez et al. 2019). Instead, one can only conclude that
the subject saw something. And again, this weaker conclusion is compatible with the unconscious
representation of the task-relevant feature of the stimulus within the (indeterminate) conscious
percept. As a result, interpreting trials in which participants report seeing just a “brief glimpse”
as conscious trials could lead researchers to systematically underestimate unconscious perception
of task-relevant features. Cases in which subjects unconsciously represent the task-relevant
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features of the stimuli and successfully perform the Type-1 task are nevertheless counted as
conscious trials.
3.2. What about visibility ratings and confidence ratings?
The same reasoning applies to ordinary visibility ratings – i.e., visibility ratings that do not rely on
the PAS categories but only on “seen” or “not seen” reports – although perhaps to a lesser
extent (e.g., Sergent & Dehaene, 2004).
It is not always clear what “seen” or “not seen” reports are about. Do they indicate that
the subject saw the target stimulus? Or a given feature of that stimulus? Or just that they saw
something? Different experiments are likely to induce different criterion contents depending on
how experimenters introduce the response categories to the subjects. Given the ambiguity of the
report categories, subjects probably often come up with their own criterion content.
For this reason, it is not clear how scientists should interpret visibility ratings. If the goal
is to determine whether subjects are conscious or unconscious of the features of the stimuli that
they use to perform the Type-1 task, it should be made explicit to them that their reports should
be about the visibility of the task-relevant features of the stimuli. And while this
recommendation could help reduce the problem to some extent, it is far from being sufficient.
As Galvin et al. (2003) recognized, even with more explicit task instructions, “It is an
unavoidable aspect of psychological experiments that no matter how well instructed, it is the
observer who determines how the task is done” (p.862).
Scientists also use confidence ratings as indications of consciousness (Norman & Price,
2015). Procedures based on confidence ratings seem to fare a bit better than other procedures
with respect to the criterion content fallacy. Across several studies (Rausch et al., 2015, 2018;
Rausch & Zehetleitner, 2016; Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013), Rausch & Zehetleitner have
observed that confidence judgments seem to be more influenced by the subjects’ conscious
perception of the task-relevant features of the stimuli than visibility judgments. For our purposes,
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an important result is that while confidence ratings tend to track the accuracy of the decision,
visibility ratings tend to track the objective strength of the stimulus (e.g. contrast) even when the
participants’ responses are incorrect (Rausch & Zehetleitner 2016).
Instead of going into the details of these experiments, let me just explain why this result
makes intuitive sense. Task-relevant and task-irrelevant features both contribute to the overall
visibility of the stimulus. On the other hand, one’s confidence that one has performed the Type-1
task correctly should be particularly sensitive to the perception of the very features that one used
to perform the Type-1 task. If the only thing you saw is entirely irrelevant for the task, that
shouldn’t make you more confident that your response was correct. Since we should expect
confidence rating procedures to be more sensitive to the subjects’ conscious perception of the
task-relevant features of the stimuli than other methods, using confidence ratings as indications
of consciousness might fare better than other methods when it comes to mitigating the effects of
the criterion content fallacy.
However, confidence judgments are not a perfect solution to the criterion content fallacy.
As noted by Rausch et al. (2018, forthcoming), although task-irrelevant features are probably
weighted differently for confidence and visibility judgments, one should still expect confidence
judgments to be somewhat influenced by the conscious perception of task-irrelevant features.
That’s because the strength of the sensory evidence for task-irrelevant features is a good proxy
for the strength of sensory evidence for task-relevant features, which is in turn a good indication
of  Type-1 performance.
In addition, confidence judgments could be influenced by additional sources of
information that are not available for the Type-1 decision (Berger & Mylopoulos, 2019; Fleming
& Daw, 2017; Rosenthal, 2018). First, sensory evidence continues to accumulate after the Type-1
decision is reached (Moran et al. 2015; Murphy et al. 2015; Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010). So, in
some cases there could be more sensory evidence at the time of the Type-2 decision than for the
Type-1 decision alone, which inflates Type-2 sensitivity – how efficiently the observer’s
confidence ratings discriminate correct from incorrect decisions (Balsdon et al. 2020; Charles et
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al. 2013; Charles & Yeung, 2019; Rabbit & Yvas, 1981; Resulaj et al. 2009). Second, the act of
reporting one’s decision on the Type-1 task could be used as evidence for confidence judgments
(Fleming & Daw, 2017). For instance, Fleming et al. (2015) showed that changing the motor
fluency of the subjects’ reports by applying TMS to the motor cortex during their Type-1
decision reports could either increase or decrease their subsequent confidence judgments (see
also Gajdos et al. 2019; Kvam et al. 2016; Siedlecka et al. 2016; Wierzchoń et al. 2014). With
those additional sources of evidence influencing confidence judgments, those judgments will
tend to track the correctness of the Type-1 decisions more accurately than they would otherwise.
And as these additional sources of evidence are unavailable for the Type-1 decision, the
sensitivity of confidence rating procedures could be inflated by cues contributing to the Type-2 –
but not Type-1 – decision, thus leading researchers to overestimate conscious perception.
In most experiments, however, the effect of incorporating additional information to the
Type-2 decision could be out-weighted by additional noise affecting the Type-2 decision process
(Shekhar & Rahnev, 2020). That is, noise affecting the Type-2 decision process could reduce
Type-2 sensitivity, thus potentially countervailing the increase in sensitivity afforded by additional
sources of evidence at the Type-2 decision level. For this reason, some dissociations between
Type-1 and Type-2 performances can be expected in nearly all experiments. The question is how
much of a dissociation would be enough to demonstrate unconscious perception. I now attempt
to address this point with some recommendations on how to move the debate forward.
4. Moving forward: Model-based assessment of  unconscious perception
Peters & Lau’s (2015) experiment is on the right track. It can be improved by striving to
minimize unnecessary differences in task-irrelevant features between the target-absent and
target-present intervals, such as, for instance, differences in luminance. In line with Peters &
Lau’s paradigm, unconscious perception would thus be indicated by above-chance performance
on a Type-1 task discrimination task while Type-2 performance is at chance-level. This result
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would provide good evidence that, while subjects do perceive the relevant feature, perceiving it
feels just like not perceiving it.
But at this point we face two problems. The first is to determine whether Type-2
performance really is ‘at chance’. It’s easy enough to prove that a coin is unfair; but how many
tosses does it take to prove that it is completely fair? A similar issue arises for identifying
‘chance-level’ Type-2 performance (Dienes, 2015).
The second problem is to determine how much of a discrepancy between Type-1 and
Type-2 performances would count as indicating unconscious perception. After all, we already
saw that Type-2 performance should generally be expected to be somewhat suboptimal given
that additional noise affects the Type-2 decision process.
A study by Azzopardi & Cowey (1997) with blindsight patient G.Y. shows us the way to
solve these two problems at once. Blindsight is typically characterized by low sensitivity in
Yes/No (YN) detection tasks – a measure of the capacity to determine whether the stimulus was
present or absent. Blindsight patients tend to report not seeing the targets. However, sensitivity
can be pretty high in two-alternatives forced-choice (2AFC) detection tasks in which the patient
is forced to identify in which interval a stimulus was presented (Weiskrantz, 2009).
Does high 2AFC performance based on stimuli that the patient denies seeing in a YN
detection task indicate unconscious perception? As opponents to unconscious perception in
blindsight are keen to point out, this discrepancy can alternatively be explained by the fact that
blindsight patients are simply reluctant to report degraded conscious experiences, thus adopting
an overly conservative criterion in the YN detection task (Campion et al. 1983; Phillips, 2021; but
see Michel & Lau, 2021).
Now comes the beauty of Azzopardi & Cowey’s (1997) experiment. SDT specifies the
mathematical relation between these two tasks (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005, p.168; but see
Yeshurun et al. 2008). In particular, sensitivity for a 2AFC task is related to sensitivity for a
corresponding YN detection task by a factor of . This relation can be exploited to get a2
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non-biased estimate of YN detection sensitivity (YN detection d’). If the difference in sensitivity
between the two tasks is best explained by response bias affecting the YN detection task only,
once corrected by a factor of , YN detection d’ should be equal to 2AFC detection d’. If, on2
the other hand, response bias is insufficient to explain the difference in sensitivity between the
two tasks, 2AFC detection d’ should remain higher than the corrected YN detection d’.
Azzopardi & Cowey (1997) obtained the latter result with patient G.Y. (later confirmed in
monkeys by Yoshida & Isa, 2015):
Because, empirically, 2AFC detection tasks yield identical values of sensitivity as do YN tasks in
normal subjects, once scaled by a factor of in accordance with SDT (as confirmed with1/ 2
control subjects under the present conditions), it follows that the hemianopic patient’s residual
vision is unlike normal, near-threshold vision and that his brain processes information about the
visual stimulus in his scotoma in an unusual way. (p.14193)
I suggest that the same general idea can be preserved for testing unconscious perception in
healthy subjects. For a given task, one can start by mapping the relation between Type-1 and
Type-2 performances in conditions in which the visibility of the stimuli is left unaltered. Once
the relation between those two tasks is well understood, one can mathematically estimate, for any
given Type-1 performance, the expected Type-2 performance if subjects were conscious of all
the sensory information used to perform the Type-1 task . This model of the subject’s ideal8
Type-2 performance can then be used as a benchmark against which to judge patterns of Type-1
& Type-2 performance in experimental conditions aimed at manipulating the visibility of the
stimuli.
This approach combined with a non-biased paradigm solves our problems. First,
unconscious perception is not indicated by ‘chance-level’ Type-2 performance. Instead, it is
indicated by the breakdown of the relation between Type-1 and Type-2 performances that would
have been expected if subjects were conscious of all the sensory information available to
8 This model-based approach is already the main idea behind the commonly used indicator meta-d’
(Maniscalco & Lau, 2012).
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perform the Type-1 task (See Balsdon & Clifford, 2018 for a similar approach). Second, this
approach can be used to estimate how much of a discrepancy between Type-1 and Type-2
performances would indicate unconscious perception: it is the level of discrepancy at which a
model postulating ideal access to the sensory information used for the Type-1 task doesn’t
provide a satisfying fit to the data (compared to alternative, sub-ideal models). Third, since this
approach is assumed to rely on 2IFC tasks, Type-2 bias doesn’t provide a good alternative
explanation for the observed discrepancy.
Ultimately, the goal is to leave unconscious perception as the only remaining explanation
for the fact that subjects can perform a Type-1 task well above the level that would be expected
given their (relative lack of) capacity to identify in which of two intervals a target feature was
presented. The strongest form of evidence for unconscious perception would thus come from
behaviors exhibiting a significant deviation from ideal Type-2 performance – indicating an
unconscious effect, in conditions where Type-1 performance is well above-chance – indicating
that subjects indeed perceived the stimuli.
Conclusion
I have argued that the main study purporting to show that unconscious perception is in fact
weak conscious perception is consistent with an interpretation in terms of unconscious
perception (Peters & Lau, 2015). While it is too early to know whether unconscious perception
exists in healthy subjects or not, I have argued that if unconscious perception exists, it could be
routinely underestimated in studies relying on the PAS, or visibility ratings. I have also suggested
an approach to move the debate forward.
Nevertheless, the accuracy and validity of detection procedures partly depend on what
one wants to do with them. Being clear on what detection procedures can validly detect should
allow experimenters to identify the best method given their current goals (Michel, 2019). For
instance, as they are currently designed, 2IFC paradigms are perfectly adequate if one’s goal is to
20
make sure that subjects do not see anything at all. Here, I aimed to argue that this high-standard
is not necessary for demonstrating unconscious perception and that, accordingly, unconscious
perception could be within our grasp after all.
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